Search results for " Shapley value"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
Risk assessment and profit sharing in business networks
2011
Abstract Nowadays network is the preferred governance form to conduct economic transactions. Network solution allows to reach flexibility maintaining cost and quality level. Since network concept refers to a great variety of organizational hybrids it is possible to choose the one that fits better market requirements. The new trends in inter-organization relationships push towards network solutions: companies are interested in relationships with partners and customers to overcome resource dependence, to enter too risky market or simply differentiate their business portfolio. The proposed research focuses on the network concept aiming at highlighting threats and opportunities to investigate t…
THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
2013
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.
Weighted weak semivalues
2000
We introduce two new value solutions: weak semivalues and weighted weak semivalues. They are subfamilies of probabilistic values, and they appear by adding the axioms of balanced contributions and weighted balanced contributions respectively. We show that the effect of the introduction of these axioms is the appearance of consistency in the beliefs of players about the game.
A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
2014
The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the \(\alpha \)-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.
Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
2010
Abstract A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.